The social world is often portrayed as being less predictable and more uncertain than the nonsocial world. We argue that if cognitive tools such as social projection and norm-based expectation can be used to predict others' behavior, social uncertainty may nevertheless trigger less search than nonsocial uncertainty. In support of this thesis, we found in two experiments that people engaged in considerably less search in a variant of the ultimatum game than in structurally identical lotteries. Even raising the stakes boosted search only in lotteries but not in the social game. Further differences in actual and anticipated search under social and nonsocial uncertainty indicate that people are aware of norm-based regularities in social worlds and that they exploit those regularities to guide their expectations. The findings highlight that the structure of social environments can afford the application of simple cognitive tools to navigate uncertainty without extensive search.
Introduction
The social world is often portrayed as different from the nonsocial world: as more complex, more challenging, and less predictable (e.g., Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Hertwig & Herzog, 2009 ). People's goals, preferences, and behavioral strategies vary widely. The human ability to generate beliefs about others' behaviors, beliefs about others' beliefs about one's own behavior, and so on, can quickly render social interactions intractable (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Humphrey, 1988; Sterelny, 2003) . Moral sentiments, emotions, and irrational impulses complicate the situation further (Hertwig & Volz, 2013; Volz & Hertwig, 2016) . Moreover, social behaviors interact with the structure of social environments, meaning that the same person may behave altruistically in one situation but selfishly in another (e.g., Blanco, Engelmann, & Normann, 2011) . Relative to this complexity of the social world, dispassionate nature appears tamer, less uncertain, and more predictable.
How to Tame Social Uncertainty?
Is the social world indeed more uncertain than the nonsocial one? Any systematic comparison needs to take into account that the social world affords people with cognitive tools that can substitute for search and help to predict others' behaviors. We focus on two candidate tools most prominent in social psychology and economics: projection of one's own behavior and expectations based on social norms. In social projection, people predict that others will act like they would themselves. Such projection need not be egocentric, self-serving, or irrational but can be Bayesian inductive reasoning at its best (Denrell & Le Mens, 2007; Krueger, DiDonato, & Freestone, 2012) . If based on existing statistical associations between one's own and others' choices, social projection can even be highly accurate (Krueger et al., 2012) . Norm-based expectations can reduce uncertainty even without social projection. Social norms enable people to generate expectations about others' behavior, whether these norms are descriptive (what most people do) or injunctive (what most people ought to do; Cialdini et al. 1991) . Wherever norms such as equity, cooperation, or reciprocity operate, they create 'focal points' (Bacharach & Bernasconi, 1997) that allow individuals to coordinate behavior under uncertainty (e.g., on fair divisions in bargaining; Bicchieri & Chavez, 2009; Carpenter, 2003; Rand et al., 2014 ). Yet norms also imply regularities beyond focal points. For instance, the more one deviates from the norm of fair division in bargaining, the greater the risk of retaliation. If one believes a norm to hold, the degree of deviation from that norm is a good predictor of the risk of rejection: The risk can simply be read off the proposed allocation without extensive search. Similarly, in social projection, individuals can enlist their own response to an allocation (i.e., "Would I accept or reject?") to evaluate the risk of rejection-again, without extensive search. For these cognitive tools to be employed, knowledge of the possible outcomes suffices.
Both tools thus imply a qualitative difference between social games (where the source of uncertainty resides in the behavior of others) and games against chance (where it resides in some random device). Although social worlds may be less predictable-for instance, because people differ in the norms they endorse, in their depth of strategic reasoning, or due to random noise in behavior-social uncertainty may, counterintuitively, trigger less search.
Do People Curtail Search When Facing Social Uncertainty?
We investigated the extent to which people search for information under social versus nonsocial uncertainty. Specifically, we adapted one of the most frequently studied social games as a paradigm of social uncertainty, the ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) .
Here, one person (proposer) divides an amount of money between herself and another person (responder). The responder can accept or reject the offer. In the variant we used, the proposer chooses between two possible divisions (mini-ultimatum game: mUG; Bolton & Zwick, 1995) . If the responder accepts, the division is implemented. If the responder rejects, both receive nothing.
The proposer thus faces social uncertainty: Which offer is the responder more likely to accept?
By empowering the responder to reject offers, the ultimatum game invokes social norms on how money ought to be shared. Yet various norms and motivations may apply. Because the interaction is anonymous, the proposer cannot draw on any knowledge about the responder. Is the responder motivated by self-interest, meaning that she will accept any nonzero offer? Or is she motivated by equality concerns, meaning that she will reject all unequal offers? In this case, where does equality begin and end? Would the responder accept offers that maximize social-though not individual-welfare? One way to react to this uncertainty is to reduce the risk of rejection by being more generous than self-interest proscribes. In fact, proposers often offer up to 40%-50% of the monetary pie. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in offers, as proposers' expectations about responder preferences differ (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Harrison & McCabe, 1996) .
Facing social uncertainty, expectations can be formed by inference from social norms, by projection of one's own behavior, or by sampling others' behaviors. We hypothesize that people engage in less search under social uncertainty where sampling may be substituted by projection and norm-based expectations than in environments where these tools cannot be enlisted. To test this hypothesis, we provided proposers in mUGs with the opportunity to sample how often allocations were accepted or rejected in the past before making their offer. They could sample at no cost, in any sequence, and as many times as they wanted (decision from experience ; Hertwig & Erev, 2009) . We compared proposers' information search to that of solitary players in lotteries with identical probabilities and payoffs. In lotteries, projection and social norms cannot be employed to evaluate risk (although expectations about environmental regularities could potentially be exploited; Leuker et al., 2018; Pleskac & Hertwig, 2014) .
Overview of Experiments
Using this paradigm, we ran two experiments to test the hypothesis that people may substitute search by cognitive tools to reduce social uncertainty. In both experiments, participants sampled and made several decisions without feedback (Table 1) , either as a proposer choosing between two allocations or as a solitary player choosing between two lotteries. Experiment 1 tested three implications of the hypothesis for search behavior, its relation to social motives, and risk attitudes. Experiment 2 tested three further implications for search, expectations, and choice, and replicated the search results of Experiment 1 under stricter conditions.
Experiment 1
Our first experiment was designed to examine the following three implications of the qualitative difference between social and non-social uncertainty for search.
Differences in search behavior. First, it implies differences in search effort, search strategy and stopping behavior. If the cognitive tools of social norms and projection are used to reduce uncertainty, people should search less in mUGs than in isomorphic lotteries. For both cognitive tools, knowledge of the possible outcomes suffices to evaluate the risk; there is no need to search to estimate their likelihood. People should therefore search for outcomes and terminate search once all outcomes have been experienced. In lotteries, in contrast, the more people sample, the more they can reduce uncertainty and accurately estimate the likelihood of the possible outcomes (Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010) . Do even risk-aware egoists curtail search? Individuals in mUGs show diverse motives, ranging from equity, social welfare, and altruism to egoism. The group with the same motive as players in lotteries is egoists: they need to gauge the risk of rejection to maximize their outcomes (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, & Sääksvuori, 2014) . Do at least they do so through search, as participants in lotteries? As they know that not everyone will respond like them and accept even low offers, they cannot evaluate the risk through social projection. Instead, they can either draw a sufficiently large sample of past behaviors, thus treating the social interaction like a lottery (Costa-Gomes, Crawford, & Broseta, 2001) , or base their expectations on social norms (even if they do not share them). In this case, knowledge of the possible outcomes suffices. Thus, if even risk-aware egoists curtail search, this would strongly support the hypothesis that people enlist cognitive tools-in this case norm-based expectations-to cope with social uncertainty.
Decoupled risk attitude and search effort. In lotteries, an association may be expected between individual risk attitude and search effort (Wulff, Hills, & Hertwig, 2015) : The more riskaverse individuals are, the more extensively they may sample to gain information and reduce their sense of uncertainty. If, however, cognitive tools substitute for search, then risk attitude may be decoupled from search effort in mUGs.
Methods

Participants.
Eighty-eight students (female = 40, M = 25.11 years) were recruited from the Technical University of Berlin and randomly assigned to either the mUG or the lottery condition in one of four sessions (n = 20-24 participants per session). The number of participants was set to at least 40 per condition before data collection. The Ethics Committee of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development approved the methodology and all participants gave informed consent at the beginning.
Experimental Materials.
Each allocation in the mUG specifies two outcomes: the proposer's and the responder's payoff. To offer realistic feedback on past responder behavior, we collected acceptance and rejection rates (rounded in steps of 5%) for 43 mUGs in a preliminary study with 24 participants drawn from the same population. From this set, we selected 12 mUGs (Table 1) . Note: Columns show the outcomes of the risky and safe option for the proposer (own) and the responder. For lotteries, only the "own" outcome is relevant. P(accept) is the probability of receiving the nonzero outcome for the respective option; corresponding probabilities of rejection and zero outcomes are not shown. EV ratio is calculated as outcome (own, risky) × p(accept) (risky) / outcome (own, safe) × p(accept) (safe) . The "type" column categorizes situations by whether the safe option represents an equal split or an unequal allocation, advantageous or disadvantageous to the proposer. Asterisks indicate the three decision situations added in Experiment 2.
In each mUG, one option was a relatively "safe" allocation, accepted by at least 90% of participants. The other was a relatively "risky" allocation, for which the probability of acceptance decreased systematically from 80% to 20% across the 12 games.
Prior to making an offer, proposers could sample from two decks of cards representing the two allocations in question (options X and Y; Figure 1 ) without costs, in any sequence, and as many times as they wanted. They were informed that the rejection rates they experienced reflected the choices of previous respondents drawn from the same population. Because the outcomes had to be learned through sampling, all participants needed to search for information, even if they were not interested in the relative frequency of the possible outcomes. After clicking on a deck, the participant saw a card for 800 ms before it was concealed again. Cards were randomly drawn with replacement from the empirical distribution of acceptances and rejections obtained in the preliminary study. Each card showed whether the offer was accepted or rejected ( Figure 1 ). Cards that signaled acceptance also showed the resulting outcomes for proposer and responder; cards that signaled rejection showed the outcome 0 for both parties. In the lottery condition, cards only showed information about a player's own outcomes.
Importantly, the probability with which outcomes occurred was identical to the distribution in the mUGs. Thus, the information that participants could sample about their own possible outcomes and their probabilities was constant between conditions. When they felt ready to make a decision, they could click on a button and indicate their choice on the next screen.
Procedures.
In total, participants sampled and made decisions in 12 situations without feedback (Table 1) , either as a proposer choosing between two allocations or as a solitary player choosing between two lotteries. Proposers were randomly matched with a different player for each choice (for instructions, see the Supplemental Material). In the mUG condition, participants completed five tasks in total. First, they made the 12 choices as proposer. Before being allowed to begin, they had to correctly answer control questions about how the payoff was determined, followed by a test trial with feedback to become acquainted with the sampling task.
Second, they took on the role of responder and stated for each situation whether they would accept or reject each of the two possible allocations ("strategy method", Brandts & Charness, 2011) . Third, they made decisions in mini-dictator games (mDGs) that presented the same allocations as mUGs, but in which the proposer faced no risk because the responder could not reject the "dictated" allocation. This approach allowed us to classify participants as risk-aware egoists, who choose the more advantageous allocation for themselves in mDGs but shy away from it in mUGs, where the responder can reject the offer. Fourth, to validate our classification based on mDGs, we added an established social value orientation measure (SVO; Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011) . Fifth, we administered a classic risk attitude measure (Holt & Laury, 2002) . The tasks always occured in this order. Within tasks, the order of decision situations and the screen position of options were randomized, except for the SVO and risk attitude measure. In the lottery condition, participants started with the test trial, and completed two tasks: making 12 lottery choices (Table 1) followed by the risk attitude measure.
Each participant was paid for one randomly drawn choice from each task in addition to a show-up fee of €3. Participants received €1 per 40 points earned in mUGs and €1 per 25 points earned in lotteries; this set-up resulted in about the same average hourly payment in both conditions. The experiment lasted approximately 60 minutes in the mUG condition and 30 minutes in the lottery condition. On average, participants earned €13.10 and €7.40, respectively. For their search strategy, we calculated how often a participant switched between options relative to the possible number of switches given the sample size (n -1) 2 . In lotteries, the switching ratio was quite low (Mdn = .07, M = .30, IQR = 0.05-0.50), indicating a systematic search strategy that separately evaluates the frequency of outcomes for each option (Hills & Hertwig, 2010 -.11, p > .250 ). Contrary to our expectation, there was no correlation in the lottery condition either (r s = -.20, p = .173). This means that individuals' attitude toward stated risk (i.e., known probabilities) did not translate into search effort with the goal of reducing uncertainty (i.e., unknown or vague probabilities; for a recent study that also found search effort to be correlated with individual ambiguity aversion but not risk attitude, see van den Bos & Hertwig, 2017).
Results
Are there differences in search behavior
Summary
In support of the hypothesis that people substitute search by cognitive tools under social uncertainty, we found three differences in search behavior between conditions. In mUGs, individuals engaged in much less search, followed a more roundwise search strategy, and stopped sooner after experiencing all outcomes than in lotteries. These differences provide converging evidence that, under social uncertainty, people searched to learn about the outcomes rather than about the risk of rejection-which suffices for social projection and norm-based expectations to evaluate the risk. Even the group or proposers who shared the motivation of players in lotteries, namely, to maximize their personal outcomes, appeared to enlist cognitive tools rather than search to cope with uncertainty.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 tested three further implications of the hypothesis that people use cognitive tools to cope with social uncertainty for search, expectations and choice. In addition, it replicated the differences in search behavior in Experiment 1 under stricter conditions. Differential impact of incentives. In lotteries, higher stakes have been found to prompt more search, presumably because people want to be more confident about outcome probabilities before making a decision (Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008; Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010) . In mUGs, in contrast, raising the stakes should not boost search, because cognitive tools (i.e., social projection and norm-based expectation) allow people to evaluate risk without the need for additional search. for the option that minimizes inequality). Although prompted by distinct preferences, inequityaverse and risk-averse individuals may thus favor the same choice.
Methods
Participants.
Ninety-three students (48 female, M = 25.39 years) were recruited and assigned to one of the two conditions in the same way as in Experiment 1.
Experimental materials.
To investigate if search efforts under social uncertainty remain low even for higher incentives, we increased the stakes and the importance of each decision by paying each participant for just one randomly drawn decision (from the task marked with an asterisk below), in addition to a show-up fee of €6. Participants earned on average €19.68
in mUGs and €18.90 in lotteries, so on average every decision was potentially worth two-thirds of the overall payment. This payment scheme also prevents participants from distributing the risk ("hedging") over multiple choices (Thaler & Johnson, 1990 ). The incentive structure was completely identical in both conditions in terms of the number of tasks, study duration (approx. 90 minutes), and exchange rate (€1 per 3 points earned).
To measure anticipated search, we showed participants in the mUG and lottery conditions the possible outcomes of both options for each situation and asked them to indicate how many samples they would take from each option if they had to make a choice afterwards. To better evaluate whether people extract information from outcomes, we included three additional choice situations, resulting in five situations each in which the "safe" option contained an equal allocation, an unequal allocation advantageous to the proposer, or an unequal allocation disadvantageous to the proposer (Table 1) .
Procedures.
The tasks in the mUG condition were proposer choices*, responder choices*, an exploratory questionnaire, anticipated sample size judgments, and risk attitude*. The tasks in the lottery condition were lottery choices*, a filler task instead of responder choices*, an exploratory questionnaire, anticipated sample size judgments, and risk attitude* 3 . All tasks were again administered in the same order, with the order of choice situations and screen position of the options being randomized within tasks, except for the risk attitude measure. Before being permitted to begin, participants in both conditions had to correctly answer control questions about how their payoff (as a proposer or lottery player) was determined, followed by a test trial with feedback. The instructions explicitly stated that both options contained two possible outcomes, one of which was zero.
Results
Was there a differential impact of incentives?
As predicted, raising the stakes in Experiment 2 increased the difference in search effort between mUGs and lotteries. Figure 2a plots for responder outcome fitted the data better than a linear model (linear mixed models with responder outcome as a fixed effect and intercepts for participants as random effects, X 2 (1) = 38.76, p < .001, likelihood ratio test). In lotteries, in contrast, the quadratic model based on the player's own outcome did not predict the anticipated sample size for the risky option better than a linear model. Aggregated across participants, mean anticipated sample size in lotteries was almost perfectly linearly related to the size of the player's own outcome (r s = .91, p < .001; Figure 3 ). At the same time, 29% of participants in lotteries anticipated searching uniformly across all situations relative to just 2% in mUGs, suggesting that these participants did not extract information from outcomes. 
Did choices in mUGs and lotteries converge?
Despite marked differences in search effort in mUGs and lotteries, participants' actual choices were quite similar. The proportion of participants choosing the risky option in mUGs and lotteries was highly correlated across the 15 choice situations (r s = .80, p < .001; Figure 4 ). In only one situation (no. 1) did their choices differ (difference of 35%), X 2 (1, N = 93) = 10.25, p = .001, ɸ = .33, 95% CI [14, 56] .
Likewise, we observed substantial correlations in Experiment 1 (r = .67, p = .018), with only two choice situations differing (no. 3 and 4; for detailed tests, see Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix).
In both experiments, differences occurred only in situations where the risky option offered the higher expected value but the safe option offered an equal split-respondents in mUGs were more likely to avoid the risk, whereas respondents in lotteries were more likely to accept it. Own Outcome
Lotteries
Why did choices converge despite the differences in search effort? We can rule out the possibility that choices in both conditions were indifferent to the probability information obtained through search. If people search more to learn about the probabilities, the experienced frequencies should inform their choice. To test this relation, we used for each participant the frequencies she experienced in each situation, and calculated how often she chose the option with the lower variance (a common risk averse attitude in lotteries; Lejarraga et al., 2012) . We observed that the more people sampled, the more likely they were to choose the option with the lower experienced variance in lotteries (r s = .51, p < .001) but not in mUGs (r s = .05 p >.250). 5 This result is consistent with the notion that the experienced frequencies inform choice in lotteries but not in mUGs where people may replace search by cognitive tools to evaluate the risk.
An additional explanation is that people may choose the option with the lower outcome variance for different reasons-namely, risk aversion in lotteries (a nonsocial preference) and inequity aversion (a social preference) in mUGs. Based on the samples people experienced in lotteries, the lower experienced variance option in fact coincided with the more equitable option in mUGs in 92% of all choices. 6 People behaved similarly in both conditions-though potentially for different reasons.
Summary
Raising the stakes boosted search in lotteries but not in mUGs. Despite higher incentives, participants in mUGs again searched to learn about the outcomes rather than about the probabilities. When outcomes were made public from the outset, the difference in anticipated search effort was even larger than in actual search. Moreover, participants in mUGs anticipated searching less for allocations that clearly indicated normative behavior, suggesting that extracted information from outcomes. Although search behavior differed markedly between conditions, choices converged. A closer look revealed that experienced probabilities mattered more for choice in lotteries than in mUGs, where people could exploit cognitive tools to cope with uncertainty. Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix. Choice situations are labeled by the ID used in Table 1 . Situations 1, 9, and 10 were included only in Experiment 2.
Discussion
The social world is often depicted as more complex and uncertain than the nonsocial world. Nevertheless, we have argued, people are less likely to cope with social uncertainty by search if the environment affords the use of cognitive tools to evaluate the risk based on knowledge of outcomes alone. In support of this hypothesis, we found three major differences in search behavior under social and nonsocial uncertainty. First, people searched considerably less in the social environment than in lotteries, compared options more roundwise, and terminated search quickly once all outcomes had been observed. Even egoists aware of the risk of rejection did not search more than others, let alone as much as people in lotteries. Second, raising the stakes strongly increased search effort in lotteries but not in mUGs. Third, based on outcomes alone, participants anticipated searching less in mUGs than in lotteries-and least of all in situations where the allocation clearly indicated norm violation or compliance, indicating that they extracted information from outcomes to generate expectations.
Do social worlds always entail much less exploration than nonsocial worlds? The perceived need for exploration likely depends on the structure of the environment. Exploration may increase as norms become less valid as predictors of behavior-for example, when injunctive and descriptive norms (Cialdini et al., 1991) conflict; when conflicting injunctive norms imply opposite behaviors; or when a social domain is not (yet) governed by norms. Yet exploration may decrease further under competition (Phillips, Hertwig, Kareev, & Avrahami, 2014) . In turn, nonsocial worlds can also offer environmental regularities (Pleskac & Hertwig, 2014 ) that may substitute for search. If people have strong expectations about the likelihood of possible outcomes based on their causal models of the physical world (Meder, Mayrhofer, & Waldmann, 2014) , search may be curtailed.
Even if social and nonsocial worlds differ in their degree of complexity and uncertainty, this does not mean that the mind perceives and treats them accordingly. The key psychological question is which cognitive tools and environmental structures the mind can enlist to navigate uncertainty. In social worlds, it is possible to exploit the fact that people are not dispassionate random devices whose behavioral propensities are revealed only through extensive exploration.
Instead, social worlds embody norm-based probabilistic structures that render the behavior of others predictable. These structures afford the application of simple cognitive tools, thus obviating the need for extensive exploration. Note: Situations marked with an asterisk were only tested in Experiment 2. Figure A1 . Distribution of participants' search effort in mUGs (N = 42), separately for riskaware egoists and participants with other motivations. Participants were classified based on the combination of mUGs and mDGs. Each dot represents the mean of one participant. The distance between the lower and upper limit of the box shows the IQR (distance between the 25th and 75th percentiles); the horizontal line represents the median. The upper (lower) whisker extends from the box to the highest (lowest) value at 1.5 * IQR.
A1. Search efforts in mUGs for risk-aware egoists vs. participants with other motivations
A 2. Search efforts in mUGs for participants with different motivations
Search effort was low across all social motivations, independent of the classification method (SVO measure, mDGs, or mDGs and mUGs combined, Figure A2 ). The lowest sample size was found for selfish (rational) proposers who propose the offer most advantageous to themselves in mDGs as well as in mUGs. Note that this group cannot be identified on the basis of SVO (selfish dictators may or may not be selfish in mUGs in which a risk of rejection exists) but only using mUGs and mDGs. However, sample size did not differ significantly between any of the motivations. Figure A2 . Boxplots showing the distribution of participants' mean sample sizes in the mUG condition (N = 42), separately for different motivations. Participants were classified either based on the combination of mUGs and mDGs (darkblue boxplots), the SVO measure (white boxplots), or mDGs (lightblue boxplots). Each dot represents the mean of one participant. The distance between the lower and upper limit of the box shows the IQR (distance between the 25th and 75th percentiles); the horizontal line represents the median. The upper (lower) whisker extends from the box to the highest (lowest) value at 1.5 * IQR.
A 3. Robustness of classification of risk-aware egoists
We classified those participants as risk-aware egoists who (i) made the self-interested choice in most mini-dictator games (mDGs), where there was no risk of rejection, but (ii) shied away from the same choice in most mUGs, where the responder could potentially reject the offer. To check the robustness of our classification, we validated criterion (i) by comparing it with the classification made on the basis of an established social value orientation (SVO) measure (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011) . The SVO measure consists of continuous dictator games designed to distinguish different social motivations, such as self-interested individualism, Mean Sample Size or prosocial concerns such as altruism, social welfare, or equality. For the classification based on mDGs, we implemented a corresponding selfish strategy (choosing the option most advantageous for oneself), a kind strategy (choosing the option most advantageous for the responder), a social welfare strategy (choosing the option with the highest sum of outcomes), and an equity strategy (choosing the option that minimizes the difference in outcomes between the two parties). Because the kind (n = 0) and welfare maximizing strategy (n = 3) were very rare, we only used the selfish and equity strategy for the final analysis, which we compared to the self-interested and prosocial SVO classification.
The SVO classifications were identical to the classifications based on mDGs for 81% of the participants. Importantly, of the 23 people classified as self-interested by the SVO, the mDGs identified 22 people. In addition, the mDGs classified 7 further individuals as self-interestedmost likely because the mDGs entail a more extreme trade-off between one's own benefit and the other person's benefit than do the continuous dictator games used in the SVO measure. Thus, prosocial behavior comes at a higher price in mDGs-allowing better comparison with mUGs, because these entailed the same binary choice situations.
However, if we classify risk-aware egoists as those who (i) were self-interested according to the SVO, but (ii) employed the equity strategy in most situations in the mUG, this group still did not sample more ( 
